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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUSNESS IN CENTRAL ·AND EAST EUROPE
Religiousness in Central and East Europe under the Conditions of Social Transformations

By Niko Toi
Dr. Niko Tos is professor of sociology at the School of Social Science at the
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. He is also the director of the Public Opinion and
Mass Communication Research Center. A previous article of his was published in
Vol. XIII, No.5 (October 1993).

1.0 Introduction
Durkheim, the precursor of contemporary sociology of religion, proceeded from the
theoretical hypothesis that religion is a social factor which exercises control on individuals.
The context of this control is the group which influences the internalization of beliefs and
customs, Congruently with this, religion plays an important integrative role. Given current
religiousness and the prevailing process of individualization and secularization, as a system
of persuasions. beliefs, customs, and rituals which binds together the members of a group,
religion itself is changing and increasingly becoming a private fact. Hence, a fact which
above all concerns the individual.
Just a cursory glance at contemporary society reveals that changes are occurring in the
values of people and social groups. Traditionally highly-valued phenomena. objects,
institutions are losing their significance. The advances of the natural sciences and technology
are replacing the mysterious with the rational; the fear of the unknown is being eradicated
by growth in human experience and knowledge; the rise in prosperity, the orientation to
the worldly and the living, the appearance of inner religiousness and de-institutionalization
of religion--signal the direction and intensity of value changes. The social character of
religion is clearly changing. Social contexts and factors determine the sociaJ position and role
of religion as well as religiousness as its individual expression. In restricting this study to
religion in the advanced Western societies and the former-socialist East and Central European
societies. the focus is placed above all on contemporary Christianity, specifically on the
functioning of the Catholic and Protestant Churches. This restricted (social, cultural) religious
space is characterized by great structural and cultural changes which in interaction are

reflected in rapidly rising rationalism and declining dependency of the individual on his
group, and thus in growing individualism and changes in customary beliefs, values, and
conduct. These structural and cultural changes are not occurring evenly nor are producing
the same effects in all European countries. Although some general trend (convergence) can
be discerned, and one of its expressions is secularization as a general developmental direction,
the differences between countries are nevertheless great. Interpersonal relations in all
segments of life (family, work, leisure time, etc) are being replaced by complex relations and
the functions of information and communication systems. Most forms of immediate group
control are disappearing. Whereas once it was nearly impossible not to go to church, express
contrary convictions and behave differently (deviantly) due to the group's prevailing values,
beliefs and conduct (Wilson, 1982), now this is becoming quite normal. People are becoming
increasingly independent of their surroundings, increasingly lenient towards themselves, and
more permissive towards others.
In describing religiousness and the position of the church in the European context today,
or over the last few decades, we cannot go past the structural changes which gradually
developed in the early 1920s and by the early 1950s diagonally split the European space into
West and East.

West Europe, as a structural-cultural space marked intensely by all the

foregoing processes and changes, is synonymous with a society with a pluralistic market,
political and ideological order. There religiousness and the church have preserved their
natural position by themselves changing. The term East is synonymous with a society that has
experienced cataclysmic structural and

c~Itural

shocks, abolished private property as well as

cultural, ideological, and political pluralism, and began to develop as a so-called socialist
state. These countries are characterized by an abrupt change in the position of the church and
scope for religious expression. Whereas the growing individuality in the West comes from the·
dissolution of the social milieu's control capabilities, in the East suppression and then loss of
religiousness

a~d

atheism result from tighter (ideological) control and stricter sanctions for

proscribed behavior, as well as the operation of the monopolistic system of indoctrination.
Earlier, the group supervised compliance with religious rules and conduct at the interpersonal
level. Under the new circumstances the group (even the family, working group, etc.)
monitored and severely penalized non-compliance with the prohibition of religious and
church life. In the West the church developed freely and yet lost its social role. In the East
it became the "opium of the masses" and "the barrier to the united revolutionary struggle of
the exploited class for heaven on earth," etc. In the former-socialist countries there was a
deliberate policy of suppression of religion and the church for decades (Hallman and de
Moor, 1963). The methods used differed; some were brutal, some subtle and refined. For
ideological and tactical reasons religion was treated as the enemy of humanity (Zulehner,
1993).
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The position of religiousness and the church in the West was influenced primarily by
structural Jand cultural changes. Some authors see the direction and intensity of the changes
as marking the secularization process while others question its very existence. For example,
Greely ( 1993) concludes from an analysis of extensive international research of religiousness 1
that not only is religion still alive but it is still significant. In his opinion· it is too early to
write an obituary for religion. According to him, there is no empirical evidence of a
long-term decline in religiousness. Its state today cannot be qualified as a regression from
that prevailing in Christian Europe.

It is difficult to describe the changes in religious

practices as regression, etc. All this suggests rejection of the secularization thesis.
On the other hand, in their interpretation of the results of an extensive international
value survey 2, Hallman and Ruud de Moor (1993) put the main stress on secularization as a
process that is radically altering Western society and culture. They find this process became
more marked after the Second World War, and they have posited three basic hypotheses with
regard to its course: (I) the more economically advanced a country, the more advanced is
secularization and individualization, at least in Western democracies, (2) religious values and
church-related moral values will continue to change in the direction of secularization and
individuality, and (3) secularization and individualism will in the end bring a convergence
amongst nations.
Secularization is expressed by the lowering of the thresholds of restrictions imposed on
the individual by society and the group; the individual chooses his/her own beliefs and
actions more freely; individual participation in church activity declines even up to the denial
of church membership; the individual becomes estranged from traditional religious culture;
the church loses its influence in society. Religiousness and the church thus become a matter
of personal choice and coercive restrictions on the individual diminish more and more. The
authors demonstrate the process of secularization by means of data on devoutness (church

1The

project "International Social Sciences Program: Religion, 1991 ," was carried out in
17 West European countries (treating the Western and Eastern parts separately), the
Philippines, New Zealand, USA, Hungary, and Slovenia. In Slovenia it was conducted as part
of the Slovenian Public Opinion project of the Faculty for Social Sciences (FDV), Center for
Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research (CJMMK), University of Ljubljana, SJM
91/2 International Survey on Belief and the Church, project leader Dr. Niko Tos, sample
N=2080.
2The

European Value Program, and the World Value Program (WVP), conducted in two
over 1981-1990 and encompassing more than 30 countries from all continents. Project
leader of the World Value Program is Prof. Ronald lngelhar, Center for Political Research,
Institute for Social Sciences, University of Michigan. Slovenia joined the WVP program in
the second stage: World Value J>rogram, project leader Dr. Niko Tos, SJM 1992; SJM92/ 1,
N=l03S; FDV, CJMMK, University of Ljubljana.

sta~es
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attendance, involvement in church organizations and belief), orthodoxy (belief in God and
fundamental religious tenets), religiousness (belief in a personal God), confidence in the
church and observance of the rites of passage. Their analysis rests on data collected at two
time cross-sections ( 1981- I 990). The very fact that the survey covered many countries,
systematically at two time cross-sections over a ten-year interval, gives an opportunity for
comparative analysis and thus opens a new chapter in contemporary sociology of religion. Let
us examine their basic findings.
The analysis of devoutness (Hallman, De Moor. 1993) shows a secularization trend in all
countries examined, with the exceptions of Ireland and Northern Ireland. There are notable
differences between countries in the intensity of the process and the times when the process
was launched intensively. The data clearly shows that the shift from higher to lower
devoutness categories comes with increases in marginal church members and finally an
increase in the undevout. Ranking highest in devoutness at both points in time are Ireland,
Northern Ireland, USA, Italy, and Spain; the lowest are Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway,
France, and Great Britain. 3 With regard to the proportion of undevout, the most outstanding
are Holland, United Kingdom, France, and Belgium while in Sweden, Ireland, and Denmark
there are nearly no undevout. All this suggests that Europe's religious space is ve;y colorful,
segmented, and defined by various specific features and circumstances of each country or
its cultural-historical context. The process of secularization is also evident and intensive in
southern Europe, in the 'traditional Catholic' countries, yet in the Scandinavian countries
which traditionally show low religiousness, there is no visible outflow from the marginally
devout (believers who rarely attend church) to the completely undevout category. The authors
conclude in relation to their first hypothesis that at least in the short term the level of
economic development is not a decisive factor in explaining the drop in devoutness. After
analysis of concrete cases they come to the conclusion that the level of devoutness (church
attendance), at least in recent decades, can be explained only by more complicated
interactions between structural and cultural factors.
They also analyzed the process of secularization from the standpoint of the orthodoxy
dimension and once again found great differences among the countries observed. This points
to distinctive and complex influences arising from the structural and cultural context of each
country or region. In addition, a connection was discerned between orthodoxy and devoutness
as well as important differences in degree of orthodoxy between particular groups in all the

3

0n level of devoutness Slovenia ranks (ISSP, Religion 1991; SJM91/2, N=2080) together
with the North and Central European states although the secularization trend, important in
the 1970s stopped and reversed. Devoutness, religiousness, and identification with religious
groups have risen in recent years. This is probably due to feedback effects of the
transformation ofthe system.
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European states examined, although not in the USA which is characterized by high
devoutness and orthodoxy.
At the core of the analysis of the dimension of religiousness is the attitude towards God,
or belief in God. Great country differences were observed in this dimension which however
are congruent with the level of orthodoxy. Exceptions are Ireland and Northern Ireland
where orthodoxy is much higher than religiousness. This is explained by the finding· that
individual belief systems in traditional countries are strictly dependant on what the group
believes. Thus they are determined by group social control and its religious practices. In
contrast to the Irish, in Italy and Portugal religiousness is considerably higher than orthodoxy.
Thus, especially in the initial phase, the process of secularization erodes orthodoxy more
easily than religiousness; religiousness is by nature more deeply-rooted. The research shows
that Sweden, Denmark, and France are the least religious and the USA and Italy the most.
From differences observed at the group level, they come to the conclusion that these country
differences are mainly a consequence of life-styles. The hypothesis of economic determinism
cannot be confirmed at this point; rather the data suggests continued development in the
direction of individuality and secularization, while the actual state of religiousness at the two
time cross-sections does not confirm the convergence assumption.
Analysis of the dimension of confidence in the church (its ability to address moral,
family, spiritual, and social problems) shows that confidence varies among countries and is
greater the higher the level of religiousness and orthodoxy. The church enjoys the highest
confidence in the USA and Northern Ireland and the lowest in Denmark, Sweden, Iceland,
and Norway. Further, the level of religiousness is shown to be a good indicator of confidence
in the church in a particular country. There is a perceptible difference in confidence in the
church between those who are active in the church, or regularly attend religious ceremonies,
and those who go to church only occasionally, the undevout. Inter-temporal comparison
shows that confidence in the church is decreasing in all countries except Spain where it has
actually risen slightly.
Following Durkheim's thesis that religious practices are crucial for religion's cohesive
function, Hallman and de Moor analyzed the attitude towards rites of passage. They find that
this function of religion or the church's role in the diffusion of these practices has decreased.
These practices are being adopted and performed not only by the devout, orthodox and
religious believers, but also by marginal believers, that is the undevout category. That is to
say non-believers, people who are not church members, follow these practices. This is not
an expression of religiousness, but it is rather an expression of the general culture which has
lost all religious meaning for a large part of the population. Hallman and de Moor conclude
that the greater degrees of secularization and individualization in society today compared
with fifty years ago are the outcome of radical changes that occurred before the 1980s.
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Church attendance is continuing to decline just like adherence to traditional religious values,
while at the same time permissiveness is growing visibly in many countries. This all indicates
the process of individualization and secularization is continuing, although the pace ofchange
seems to have been waning in the past decade. Often the changes are also a consequence of
generational succession.
The hypqthesis of economic determinism is not confirmed. The case of high religiousness
in the USA in particular militates against it. Moreover, a tendency towards convergence, as
conformity of predominating values, judgments, and beliefs has similarly not been
confirmed.
In comparison with Greeley's study, which did not go beyond a superficial examination,
Hallman and de Moor conducted a theoretical and methodologically sound analysis which
revealed the true nature and extent of the process of secularization in contemporary
European countries. This was the main reason why it has been presented in such detail here.
Now let us go back to the starting point with a question: if the position of the church in
the so-called socialist Central and East European countries is impaired, limited, and
marginalized, and further, if these societies have developed under the influence of
conformity, one-party rule, a single ideological dogma, with a high degree of internal control
and a developed repressive apparatus, etc., did their secularization process unfold in the same
way as in the Western cultural space? Was religious culture in these countries determined
merely by decrees which prescribed educational values, the intellectual content of the mass
media, the form of ideological control, and the tools of ideological compulsion? Considering
the nature of religiousness and its interwoveness with cultural tradition, such assumptions
may be rejected. It is unlikely that a uniform system of ideological repression like that which
prevailed in East and Central Europe would produce a completely uniform level of
religiousness in conflict with consciousness and practices. The systemic determination of
religiousness is greater the longer the systems are in operation and the more repressive they
are. The level of ideological orthodoxy in a country is a significant co-determinant of the
scope for functioning of the church and thus for expression and preservation of religiousness.
The development and practice of religious culture was certainly influenced by the closed
nature of these societies, or countries, and their prosperity. Further, the state of religious
culture in a country is influenced by the church's historical position, especially during the
Second World War and the equating of religious and national identity, and so on. In all these
respects the Central and East European countries differ widely. Thus, Poland is distinguished
by its highly-developed Polish-Catholic national identity and the special role of the Polish
church throughout national history, particularly during the Second World War and later when
it became synonymous with resistance to the Communist regime. In contrast, was the position
of Slovenia which developed within Yugoslavia, with the least orthodox and most liberal
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one-party regime, considerable openness, and relatively high prosperity. On the other hand,
the former-GDR or East Germany (and the Czech Republic and Baltic states) was marked
by the highest level of systemic orthodoxy, total control of all relations between the
individual and the group, and a developed system of sanctions.
The formation and expression of religiousness and the position of the church were also
influenced by factors other than these system specific ones, as shown by shifts in
religiousness and devoutness in the West European space. There is no good and convincing
proof for the assertion that secularization, as a process of leaving the church, is a 'natural
process' in the open and democratic societies in West Europe, while in Central and Eastern
Europe it is purely systemically determined. In the latter space too, there were processes of
de-agrarianization, industrialization, urbanization, agglomeration in urban centers and
metropolises, with a corresponding real decline in the power of control mechanisms and the
process of individualization. Precisely these processes carried these societies across the
threshold of really existent socialism. The more dynamic systems came apart under the weight
of internal liberalization while the more rigid and orthodox systems disintegrated in a wave
of revolutionary transition. Thus, after the mass flight of its people and the fall of the wall,
East Germany collapsed. By contrast, Slovenia took shape as an independent democratic
country gradually through internal liberalization within the legal framework in the period
after 1985, although on the way it had to fight a ten-day war against the former- Yugoslav
Army. These are two extreme examples of the course of transition in Central and East
Europe which point to the initial or previous state of affairs, which also applies to religious
culture as an important expression of national culture. It is unwarranted to expect
religiousness to be uniform in Central and East European countries and hence confirm its
crude systemic determination. These countries with their socialist system should also be
expected to differ widely in all aspects of religiousness and attitudes towards the church. The
range of differences between them is wide and the factors determining them diverse. Indeed
the hypothesis that the predominantly socialist system in these countries promoted the
secularization process in all cases cannot be confirmed.
Hereafter attention is centered on the Central and East European countries. Drawing on
the two principal researches first an examination is made of the state of religious
consciousness and attitude towards the church in the nine Central and East European
countries along the diagonal from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea. Next the state of
religiousness is examined in the unified German space (that is the former Federal Republic
and German Democratic Republic, or for convenience West and East Germany) as a case of
extreme systemic determination of religiousness and religious culture. Besides this, the
situation with religious culture in Slovenia is presented by way of comparison.
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2.0 Religiousness in Times of Social Transformation--The Position of the Church in Central
and Eastern Europe
Religious values were given strong emphasis in the European Values Program which at
first in 1982 covered twenty West European countries and was expanded to more European
and Non-European countries when repeated in 1990/91.

A separate analysis and

interpretation of nine Central and East European countries, namely, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania,· Poland, East Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia was
done by a group of researchers, religious scholars, and pastoral theologians at the Pastoral
Forum in Vienna. 4 Two features were more or less characteristic of all the selected countries:
(I) in the past fifty years they had Communist party rule, a socialist social order and (with
the exception of Slovenia) they had been part of the Soviet block, and (2) by
cultural-historical legacy and tradition the majority of believers are Christians, or more
specifically Catholics. A feature of their revolutions and transition was stress on national
identity as the centerpoint of the liberalization and democratization process, especially in
those cases involving dissociation and separation from a multinational state formation and
attainment of statehood.
One of the aims of the Pastoral Forum was to more accurately measure by means of
research methods, the extent of the damage to the religious culture in these countries.
Mention has to be made at the outset of the methodological difficulties the researcher
wittingly or unwittingly faces in attempting this evaluation at the empirical level because
of the lack of prior measurements or criteria for these evaluations. The extent and depth of
changes which are not determined systemically is hard to separate from all others occurring
in a particular social and temporal context.
It is self -evident that systemic determination (the socialist system) in the course of fifty

years and the influence of the prevailing ideological and systemic indoctrination do not have
the same effects in different countries. Particular attention shall be given here to Slovenia's
position in relation to the others. Three dimensions: religiousness, Christianity (orthodoxy)
and devoutness 6 were employed to examine the state of belief and the church in these
countries following the end of the socialist period and their transition to a pluralistic
democratic development.

4
P. Zulehner, ed., Kirchen im iibergang in freiheitliche Gesellschaften, (Vienna:
Pastorales Forum E.V., 1994), p. 174.

5

The operationalization of these dimensions which differs in part from the WVP analysis
(Hallman, de Moor, 1993) is described in Zulehner, P., 1994.
8

2.1 Religiousness
Eight criteria of religiousness were used: the importance of God in life, frequency of
prayer, solace from faith, desire for meditation, attitudes towards religious rites at birth,
marriage and death, religious self-evaluation, religiousness of the source family, agreement
with parents on religious questions. Orthodoxy was measured in terms of adherence to
Christian religious teachings, attitude towards the image of God and belief in resurrection.
Devoutness was defined by membership in religious groups, frequency of church attendance,
confidence in the church and view of domains in which the church can provide answers and
in which it should be engaged. Data from the International Value Survey used here are based
on three theoretically distinct areas: examination of personal religiousness, the Christian
content of personal religiousness, and attitude towards various religious or spiritual groups.
We shall look at the results in sets.
Frequency of prayer and attitude towards rites. Personal religiousness may be

evince~

through the frequency of prayer and attendance at or performance of rites at important
events in life such as birth, marriage, and death (rites of passage); in this framework we also
present data obtained from questions concerning belief as a source of solace and the desire
for meditation.
In all the countries examined, except for Poland, the need for religious rites was the most
prevalent at times of death. On all the other criteria of religiousness country differences were
evident. It is noteworthy, however, that the need for rites at important times in life is
prevalent and common to believers in all countries; this also holds in the main for the desire
to meditate, although there are manifest country differences and deviations in view of faith
as a source of solace. The differences in frequency (or abstention from) prayer are greater.
Poland stands out in a class of its own on all the criteria of religiousness. Next in line
with lower religiousness are Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The third group,
with a considerably lower level of religiousness, includes Latvia, Estonia, East Germany, and
the Czech Republic. The differences between the countries observed are more than evident.
A further criterion of personal religiousness was the evaluation of the importance of God
in a person's life. A ten-degree scale was used for measurement. The country differences
were not as great as in the first case, although again Poland stands out with the highest value
accorded to the significance of God. The second class includes Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Slovenia, and the third, with the lowest average evaluation, East Germany and
the Czech Republic.

9

Self-evaluation of religiousness. 6 Great country differences were found on this criterion.
Whereas 96% of Poles consider themselves religious, only about 20 % or nearly five times
fewer Estonians do. The proportions were exceptionally low in East Germany, Czech
Republic, and Latvia (in the 32% to 38% range), while Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, and
Lithuania formed a intermediate class. The highest level of confirmed atheists was found in
East Germany (17%) followed by Slovenia (7%) although overall the level of declared atheists
is strikingly low. This indicates varying courses of modernization (industrialization,
urbanization), intensities of ideological pressure throughout the fifty-year postwar
development and the effects of ideological indoctrination. It may be inferred that the effect
of ideological indoctrination in Poland was negligible. Rather the opposite effects may be
inferred--leading to total identification with the church as the core of religious-national
identity and the carrier of opposition to the system. 7 On the other hand in Estonia, East
Germany, and the Czech Republic the effects of ideological indoctrination are more than
evident, although only in East Germany do they reach the final form of active atheism.

Transmission of religious culture. This. concerns the relationship between religiousness or
religious culture in two succeeding generations and the emphasis placed by the family on
religious education. The question on the religiousness of parents reveals two things: first, the
religious socialization environment of the population, and second, in combination with the
questions on religious self-evaluation and the importance of religious education, it indicates
any shifts in the prevailing type of religious culture. The data again fall into three types or
classes. Poland stands by itself in the first class with no significant deviations found on the
intergenerational plane (between the religiousness of parents and current religious education).
Virtually all Poles live in Catholic families, describe themselves as believers, and two-thirds
of them stress the importance of firm belief or religious bonds as an important educational
rule in the family. The lowest group or type includes East Germany, the Czech Republic,
Latvia, and Estonia. It is characterized by a low level of recognizable religiousness of the
family environment (from 48% to 19%), a low level of religiousness of the respondents (from
38% to 20%), and rare mention of religion as an educational principle in rearing children
(from 13% to 3%). Between these the middle category, which includes Slovakia, Hungary,
Lithuania, and Slovenia is characterized by a high initial (parental) religiousness,

6

A separate question about personal belief required classification into four groups: (I)
believer, (2) I am not a believer, (3) I am a confirmed atheist and (4) I am undecided.
7The

church as a point of identification in the process of transition is losing importance
as shown at the last elections ( 1994 ).
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predominant religiousness of the respondents, and relatively limited emphasis on religiousness
or faith as a principle in child-rearing (from 33 to 21%).
With respect to the personal religiousness dimension then the nine countries examined fall
more or less regularly into three groups on all eight criteria. These groups may be described
as: predominantly high religiousness, average religiousness with signs of growing
non-religiousness, and low religiousness with a predominance of non-religiousness. On all
the criteria examined only Poland fits into the first group. Slovakia follows the most closely,
at the top o_f the

s~cond,

with Slovenia, Hungary, and Lithuania coming next. Latvia ranks

between the second and third group. The Czech Republic, East Germany, and Estonia group
clearly in the third, lowest category.
2.2 Christianity (Orthodoxy)

Criteria indicating the Christian character of personal religiousness, or orthodoxy, were
also employed in the Value Survey. First attitudes were examined towards fundamental
tenets from the Christian and one from the Asian religious tradition. Belief in God, the soul,
sin, life after death, heaven, resurrection, the devil, hell, and reincarnation were examined
by means of a multi-degree scale allowing a hierarchy of beliefs in these religious tenets to
be constructed.
The descriptive data clearly shows the great differences in the belief in basic religious
tenets and further that these differences are obtained not only between countries but also
within them. The most generally accepted religious tenet is belief in God (95% to 20%)
followed by belief in sin (84% to 20%), the soul (72% to 13%), life after death (62% to 11 %),
heaven (67% to 7%), and resurrection (64% to 7%). Belief in reincarnation is lowest (31% to
12%), followed by belief in hell (37% to 4%) and the devil (30% to 4%). Components of
religious teachings with a positive, optimistic connotation (such as belief in God, the soul,
life after death, and heaven) are accepted more strongly and distinctly than those with a
negative or repressive connotation (hell, the devil). The ranking of attitudes regarding all
nine religious truths completely confirms the foregoing categorization. Poland comes in the
first category by itself followed by Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia, and all the other
countries come in the lower half of the distribution.
The concept of God was examined by means of a question indicating a theistic (Christian)
or a deistic view of God, or an agnostic or atheistic view. The data do net yield the same
distribution of countries into three categories as before. Poland once again is in a category
of its own with a theistic view prevailing strongly (79%) and a negligible incidence of all
other responses. In Hungary, which comes second in frequency of the theistic view, there is
also a significant proportion of agnostic and atheistic views, while in Slovenia, Lithuania, and
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Slovakia deistic views are more prevalent. In the rest of the countries examined the frequency
of theistic views is negligible, and deistic views predominate, with the exception of East
Germany where atheistic views (48%) are the strongest.
As already noted belief in God is at the core of personal faith and is the central religious
tenet unparalleled by any other tenet or belief. This holds for all Central and East El)ropean
countries examined with the exceptions of Lithuania where belief in sin and the soul are
more prevalent, the Czech Republic where the belief in sin is more marked, and Latvia
where belief in the soul is stronger in part. This and the fact that an average belief in sin
takes second place, before all other religious tenets, indicates the ethical dimension of
religiousness.
In Christian teachings the concept of an after-life, belief in resurrection and heaven are
significant. The differences in the concept of God presented are expressed in their entirety
in the belief in an after-life, resurrection, and heaven. Belief in these basic Christian
teachings are most strongly rooted in Poland, followed by Slovakia, Latvia, Hungary, and
Slovenia. It is however declining in the other countries examined.
Just as in the analysis of self -evaluation of religiousness, it may be concluded here that
there are significant differences between the Central and East European countries examined
in the Christian character of beliefs. Yet again Poland is a category of its own. It is followed
by Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, and Lithuania while the Christian character of belief is
decomposing in the Czech Republic, Latvia, Estonia, and East Germany.
2.3 Devoutness
The third dimension examined concerns attitudes towards specific religious groups.
Measured in terms of membership and involvement in these groups, this criterion is usually
characterized as devoutness. The European Values Survey offers a number of indicators:
membership of religious groups, confidence in the church, attendance at church services.
Added here is presentation of data on views regarding the everyday issues the church should
help resolve, that is the social matters it should address.

Membership in religious groups. The proportion of respondents that do not belong to any
religious group varies in the Central and East European countries examined. By far the
highest proportion not identified with a religious group is found in Estonia (86%), followed
by East Germany (62%), the Czech Republic, and Latvia (61 %). The lowest proportions were
found in Poland (4%) and Slovenia (27%). In line with this there are manifest differences in
the proportion belonging to a religious group and particularly the Catholic church. Thus,
membership in the Catholic church predominates in Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, and
Lithuania. There are substantially more Catholics than Protestants among believers in
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Hungary and the Czech Republic, while Protestants significantly outnumber the Catholics in
East Germany. Among the countries examined, !llembership in otherchurches (Orthodox) is
more pronounced in Latvia (12%), Estonia (6%), and Lithuania (5%).
Once again the countries fall into three groups. In the first

come~

Poland without parallel.

The second, where the proportion of members of religious groups ranges between 73% to
57%, includes Slovenia, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Hungary. In tht: thlrd category, with
approximately 39% to 40% of respondents identifying with religious groups comes Latvia,
the Czech Republic, and the East Germany. Estonia stands apart

wi~h

a mere 14%.

Attendance at religious ceremonies. The differences between countries.are large. In Poland
83% of the population attends church ceremonies at least once a month, 42% in Slovakia, 35%
in Slovenia, 28% in Lithuania, 23% in Hungary, 13% in the Czech Republic, 17% in East
Germany, and only 12% in Latvia. Regular attendance at Sunday services varies even more,
from 65% to 5%.

Confidence in the church. The confidence the church enjoys among the people or
believers in a country or milieu is significant in consolidating religious culture and
intensifying contacts with the church. This confidence is higher or lower depending on the
situation in which the church functions and the. way it has functioned in the. past and is
functioning in the present. Comparative analysis shows that the differences in level of
confidence are pronounced and great. The countries rank differently on this criterion than
the usual three category classifications. Poland again stands apart with a high level of
confidence in the church. But grouping in the second category are Lithuania, Latvia,
Hungary, and Estonia which are characterized by a predominant confidence in the church.
The third category includes Slovakia, East Germany, Slovenia, and the Cze.ch Republic where
lack of confidence in the church is characteristic. While the ranking of East Germany and
the Czech Republic are in a sense internally consistent, for they are both characterized by
low socio-religiousness in general, the Slovakian and Slovenian cases require special

.

.

explanation. Namely, lack of confidence in the church is expressed by 51% of respondents
in Slovakia and 61% in Slovenia. In view of the high socio-religiousness in these countries,
which places them above Lithuania and Hungary and behind Poland, it is not possible to
speak of an impairment of their religious culture but rather of an impaired image of the
church in their value systems. The fact that the church·has not succeeded in winning greater
confidence during the transition after the democratic revolution as institutions of the new
era and fulcrums of liberalization and independence (both countries have recently achieved
sovereignty), is not entirely due to their Tory repression in the past. 8 One possible.

8

The differences between Slovakia and Slovenia in this respect are more than evident. For
decades Slovenia has been endeavouring to settle relations between the church and the state
(See: Roter,Zdenko, 1993) whilst in the past decade dogmatic pressures were easing, political
I3

explanation may be its politicization in the between-war period, the way its relations with
the state were arranged, and its current political involvement in the newly independent
countries. Whether this explanation suffices or not requires detailed study. In Slovenia's case
the low level of confidence in the church as an institution and in the clergy, which is
associated with high identification with the religious community and above-average
religiousness, may derive from earlier resentments and historical actions which brought the
church and politically active clergy into conflict with the Liberals and subsequently the
Communists, movements in the pre- and between-war period, such as, the insularity of the

~burch institutions, its reservations towards its followers' extra-institutional movements, and
at the time of the social turnaround, its uncritical bias in the name of reconciliation, as well
as its ties to the past, the attempt to revive the church's position of social power through the
restitution or re-privatization of its former semi-feudal estates, and further the open ties of
part of the clergy to right-wing, conservative political forces and parties. Of course, these
critical qualifications and remarks do not apply to the institutional church as a whole, but to
individual, publicly prominent parts of it. This nonetheless is enough for the relatively
adverse attitude amongst the public and believers towards the church and the clergy in
general.
View of the role of the church. This aspect of the survey was measured by two questions:
can the church provide answers to questions in the domain of morals issues, family life,
spiritual and social problems and personal needs? Is it called upon to take positions on the
situation in· the Third World, racial discrimination, disarmament, environment, euthanasia,
abortion, unemployment, extra-familial relations, homosexuality, and government policies?
Answers to the first question show that the differences among countries are very
pronounced. In Poland the high level of confidence in the church is reflected in the position
that it is entirely capable of dealing with spiritual needs, family relations, and moral matters.
Views on the church's capabilities to address social and life issues are more reserved.
Hungarians and Lithuanians hold similar views, except that they also stress the role of the
church in addressing social problems. Non-religious Czechs and East Germans and the
religious Slovaks hold very similar views on its authority in spiritual matters and personal
needs; however, they differ with respect to family matters and social issues. To a great extent
Czechs and Slovaks ascribe it authority to deal with problems at the family level but less so
with social problems. The exact opposite is the case with East Germans: only a third considers
that the church has the authority to address family matters, while a half considers it called
upon to address social issues. On an international scale Slovenia stands out, together with

relations· were liberalizing internally, etc.
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Latvia lagging substantially lags behind it, with a exceptionally low estimate of the church's
'capabilities' to act. Respondents in Slovenia primarily stress its spiritual role, that is, its
authority to address questions on the meaning of life (51%); its role in the ethical domain is
relatively positively rated (39%), while its success regarding family and current social issues
is evaluated considerably lower (34%, 32%).
The majority of respondents or believers in all the countries examined ascribe the church
a primarily spiritual role, and emphasis on other domains varies from one country to another.
For example, East Germans emphasize social problems, the Poles and Lithuanians family
problems, and the Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, and Slovenes moral problems as the second
most important domain. There are also characteristic differences among countries regarding
the matters with which the church should concern itself. Above all it is clear that the East
Germans ascribe the highest and broadest 'authority' to the church. 9 The country differences
in expectations relating to the activities of the church are great. Despite their low level of
religiousness the East Germans evaluate the church's authority the highest whereas both the
highly religious Poles and the low-religious Czechs are more moderate and reserved. With
their above-average religiousness both the Slovaks and the Slovenes are the most restrained
in their rating of the church's 'authority'. Thus, the East Germans, Hungarians, and Poles
strongly stress its role in addressing Third World problems, as well as racial discrimination;
disarmament is stressed as a church concern by the Czechs and Hungarians, ecology by the
East Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, and Poles, euthanasia by the East Germans, Poles and
Hungarians, the right to life or abortion by the Poles, East Germans, and Hungarians,
unemployment by the East Germans, Hungarians, and Poles; extra-marital relations by the
Poles, homosexuality by the Poles, and government policies by the former-East Germans.
Disarmament and environmental protection are singled out strikingly by the Slovaks and
Slovenes, who also show the least desire for the church's involvement in the sphere of
government policies.
As in judgments of the church's capability or effectiveness, there are manifest country
differences in relation to judgments of the church's authority which deviate significantly
from the foregoing country distribution. Respondents in low-religious East Germany are
the most open regarding domains of the church's concern and rate highly its authority to
address nearly all current affairs, yet they are reserved about its authority in even traditional
domains, such as sexual morality. In their estimates the Poles are much more reserved and

9

With respect to ten domains cited the East Germans responded positively 6.3 times,
Hungarians 5.2, Poles 5, Czechs 4.2, Slovaks 3, and Slovenes 2.8 times.
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completely deny it the authority to address government policies. 10 The Slbvdks and the
Slovenes, who otherwise positively evaluate the church's capacity to address qUestions about
the meaning of life and spiritual matters, are very restrictive, and a broad da\nain is allowed
~-·lj

only by individuals or groups characterized by high religiousness. On:: '.-~verage
in both
'(' ·.

countries, the church as an institution is not ascribed an important role>a~lall, and lack of
confidence is expressed in its involvement in these domains.

.& .'

f

An internal incongruity may be seen in the data on devoutness. The!q.Jestion arises as to
th.e methodological adequacy of treating this dimension as a single wH~le·. Religious group
membership, confidence in the church and clergy, judgement of their effectiveness or
capability and their 'authority' are in part correlated positively and in part negatively. Thus,
Poland is characterized by a high level of identification with the Catholic church, high
confidence, and a high rating of its effectiveness, but an average rating of its 'authority'.
Outstanding is the marked rejection of the church's involvement in the domain of social
affairs and government policies. Substantially different from Poland is East Germany where
there is a low level of identification with the church, low confidence, an average rating of
its effectiveness, while its authority in all domains (except sexual morality) is given
above-average rating. Slovenia (and Slovakia) are characterized by a high level of
identification with the Catholic church, a below average low confidence in the church and
the clergy, low estimate of its effectiveness or capability to deal with non-spiritual questions,
and an especially low estimation of its authority to address various moral and social issues.
The following, more detailed presentation of the effects of systemic determination of
religious culture draws on a study of the position of religion in the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG), namely in the earlier (former-FRG, hereafter 'West Germany') and the new
(former-GDR, hereafter 'East Germany') .federal lands.

3.0 Religiousness in Germany: The Effects of the Two Systems
The Values Survey provided a special opportunity to study the effects of systemic
determination of religious culture. It included questions on religion and was carried out after
the unification of the two Germanies using sub-samples for the two previously separate
states. 11 Since this survey was done immediately after unification, it is assumed that it allows

10

This is shown by voting behavior at the last elections in Poland, in 1994.

11

Mohler, Peter, Ph. et. al., Die Basisumfrage, (ALLBUS) Zentralarchiv fur empirische
Sozialforschung, Mannheim 1991. The research sample included 1477 respondents from the
territory of former-West Germany (FRG) and 1537 from former-East Germany (GDR).
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examination and measurement of the effects of fifty years of different systems of
socialization and indoctrination, with diametrically opposite values and ideological
foundations, in their relatively pure and unaltered forms. Of course, this applies without
reservation for the lands from West Germany, but this is not the case with lands from East
Germany. In the late 1980s, the time of turmoil before the revolution and unification, a new
type of political socialization was launched there by the social movements, the mass escapes
and demonstrations. This was presumably a time of powerful value transformations. But
these transformations could not reach down to primary socialization, and accordingly one part
of the value system, primarily religious culture, which had formed in the course of decades
remained more or less unchanged. The deeper levels of religious culture and the very essence
of belief could not be changed merely by the revolution. Thus, the only changes that could
have occurred would be on the surface, such as attitudes towards institutions and the church
within a plural society and their social roles in it.
On the analytical plane religiousness, to the extent that it is at all accessible to study, has
the function of an experimental variable. With the developed and especially the West
European societies we may assume a convergence of social development processes and hence
of values. The situation in West Germany's social space, in terms of its economic and urban
development, high prosperity, predominant values, secularization processes and religious
culture is typical of developmental trends in West Europe. By contrast East Germany,
although it carried the seeds of its destruction from its very creation, was a trenchant
caricature of the situation and trends in the East European space up to the mid-1980s. Crude
industrialism, abolition of the market, one-party rule with a complete ideological monopoly
in schools and the media, denial of all individuality, and physical segregation from the
German and European surroundings typified its development. These crude divisions affected
the one and the same nation. Pacification led the West Germans to democratization and a free
market system, but it took the East Germans from one totalitarian system to another. At the
time of division both were marked by a high level of war damage. East Germany was
predominantly agrarian, the West industrial. While the East was predominantly Protestant the
West was half Protestant and half Catholic. Directly after the war the West received
substantial financial aid as a bulwark in the contest between the two blocs, whereas the East
was industrially exploited intensively and occupied militarily by the Soviet Union for many
years. These and other circumstances cannot be controlled in the present experiment, yet they
nonetheless significantly co-determined the direction and course of social and cultural
development in East and West Germany.
Let us return to the beginning. Using the extensive data (All bus, 1991 ), Terwey ( 1992)
extracted and analyzed some basic socio-religious findings, such as identification with
religious groups, attendance at religious ceremonies, belief in God, belief in Christian
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religious teachings and supernatural phenomena (superstition). Terwey sought to show the
differences (and similarities) in religious orientation in the two parts of

unit~d

Germany.

Here we go further and add Slovenian data to the presentation in an atte~pt to take
Slovenia's bearings in relation to the two (extreme) German systems.

a

Identification with religious denominations. West Germany is marked by high level of
identification with the church (89.4%) and East Germany by an exceptionally low level
(35.3%) while Slovenia comes close to West Germany (73.2%)(12). The greitt majority of
respondents in West Germany (89.4%) identified with Christian groups, mostly the. Protestant
(45%) and Catholic church (41.9%). Me~bers of the Protestant church (28.8% of the total)
predominate among East German respondents who identify with the church, and signific~ntly
fewer belong to the Catholic (5.5%) and other Christian churches (2.6%). The. situatioh. in
Slovenia is simpler: 68% belong to the Catholic church and 2.8% to other Christian churches.
Thus, East Germany deviates significantly. Here. the initial situation in both parts of
Germany has to be taken into account. 12 Revealing is the fact that in the 1950s Catholics
made up II%, Protestants 80.6%, and only 7.6% did not subscribe to any religiort (Vicher,
1990, 308). There was then an extremely drastic fall in church membership in East Germany;
both of the dominant churches were strongly affected although the Protestant more than the
.

.

Catholic church. It may be said for both West Germany and Slovenia that despite the
secularization process, religious group or church membership (Catholic and Protestant) is still
high and an expression of cultural, civilizational, national, and religious identification.

Attendance at religious ceremonies. This is closely associated with identification with
religious groups. Frequency of attendance differs in the three countries with the demarcation
line running between East Germany and Slovenia on one side and West Germany on the
other. The percentage of respondents regularly attending ceremonies (more than once a week)
reaches a good fifth of Slovenia's population (22.7%), a seventh (14.7%) in West Germany,
and only a thirtieth (3.5%) in East Germany. The differences are just as sharp in regard to
the proportion of non-churchgoers. 13 This ranges from more than four-fifths (81.9%) in East
Germany, a good half (53.7%) in West Germany to over two-fifths in Slovenia (42.6%). In
these three states then the practice of attending church or religious services is the
most-developed in Slovenia, with West Germany lagging slightly, while it is virtually
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Data from the International Survey on Belief and the Church, ISSP, SJM 1991/2,
N=2080; this was conducted at the same time as the German survey with the same
methodology.
13

The question of how much Nazism and the period of the Third Reich affected
religiousness and in particular moral values was neglected here.
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non-existent in East Germany as an expression of church membership and intimate personal
religiousness. On this criteria then the three states seem to fall into two distinct systems: West
Germany in one, and Slovenia and East Germany in the other.

Belief in God. If the church as an institution and point of reference and activity has
disappeared in East Germany, yet is strongly present in West Germany and Slovenia, the
question arises whether personal, inner religiousness has also been erased. Further, does
identification with the church and attendance suffice as a measure of inner personal
religiousness? Is the flight from the church in East Germany primarily a 'concession' to the
system (just as leaving the church may be a form of tax avoidance in West Germany). Data
for the two parts of Germany reveal essential differences in inner religiousness (belief in
God) as well as changes in personal faith. The West Germany data show confirmed atheists
make up less than a tenth (9.6%) while less than a quarter (23.4%) have stopped believing in
God. By contrast in East Germany confirmed atheists constitute a half (50.7%), while another
quarter (24.9%) report they have stopped believing in God so that together with the atheists
they make up a three-quarters of the population. Whereas West Germany is characterized by
predominant belief in God, East Germany is characterized even more so by unreligiousness.
Comparable data from Slovenian surveys indicates that Slovenia again groups together with
West Germany, for only 19% of respondents were undecided on a comparable question. The
proportion answering affirmatively that they believe in God reached about three-fifths; a
little less than two-fifths are not believers so that confirmed atheism ('I do not believe in god
and never have') is stronger in Sloveni.a than in West Germany. The Value Survey indicates
that in Slovenia a third (32.7%) do not believe in God, and about the same in West Germany,
whereas three-quarters are not believers in East Germany. Once again the line of division
places West Germany and Slovenia on one side and East Germany on the other, although the
survey also reveals that the proportion of confirmed atheists is higher in Slovenia than in
West Germany.
Belief in God is at the center of the teachings of both main Christian churches (Catholic

.

and Protestant) in this space. Thus in conjunction with attitude towards other Christian
teachings, it is a measure of inner religiousness. Since belief in God in the populations under
consideration is less widespread than identification with a religious group, evidently a
substantial part of those that belong to a religious group and attend services do not believe
in God or other religious tenets. The data also show some individuals believe in God and
other tenets even though they do not identify with a religious group nor attend religious
ceremonies. No substantive differences were found among the three sub.:.samples in this
respect.

Other religious teachings. Comparative analysis of the data for other religious teachings
shows that belief in life after death ranges from more than forty percent (44.4%) in West
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Germany to less than thirty percent (28.8%) in Slovenia and over ten percent ( 12.2%) in East
Germany. Slovenes believe in hell more (23.6%) than West Germans (20.3%) while few East
Germans (5.7%) believe in it at all. West Germans (35.0%) believe in heaven more than
Slovenes (27 .5%), and even the East Germans have not allowed it to be taken away from them
(17 .4%). Belief in the devil is lowest in all three samples; there are no real differences
between Slovenia and West Germany. In all three belief in miracles is the most widespread.
West Germans believe in them the most (51.2%), followed by Slovenes (42.8%), and East
Germans (34.9%).
Belief in Christian religious teachings is in a sense uniformly prevalent in both Slovenia
and West Germany whereas in East Germany it is barely evident, with the exception of belief
in heaven and miracles. Clearly there is a gap in East Germany between religiousness and its
Christian content which has almost completely disappeared. Since it may be assumed that the
fundamental religious tenets were more strongly instilled and expressed in religious
consciousness and beliefs in West Europe, it may be concluded that a quite intensive
secularization process is taking place in West Germany and Slovenia. But the state of
religiousness found in East Germany cannot be ascribed to the normal course of
secularization triggered by processes of modernization and individualization. It is above all
a case of forced atheism and accelerated secularization that rested on ideological monopoly
in the schools, in promotion and sanctions as well as mass indoctrination through the media.
While religious content and belief have been almost completely driven from consciousness
in East Germany, belief in paranormal phenomena, such as lucky charms, soothsayers and
astrologers, miracle healers and the like are more 'usual'. Slovenians believe in all kinds of
paranormal phenomena more than respondents from either part of Germany. This is
especially so with regard to belief in miracle healers and soothsayers. which is twice as
frequent as in West and East Germany. Otherwise, the East Germans are slightly less
superstitious than West Germans. Whether the higher superstitiousness in Slovenia is a
reservoir for religiousness, or the exact opposite, is hard to decide.
In concluding this review it may be noted that the extent of identification with the
church and the degree of church integration is a point of significant difference between West
and East Germany. Identification with the church and religiousness have practically
disappeared from East Germany. If this is also characteristic of West Germany, then it may
be ascribed to the secularization processes similarly under way, more or less intensively in
Western (European) democratic societies. These processes are gradually emptying belief of
substantive religious teachings. Comparative analysis and particularly the attempt to
determine Slovenia's place in relation to West and East Germany shows a sharp division, with
Slovenia standing closer to West than East Germany. It may be assumed that in Slovenia the
religious substrata was not substantially damaged and that it has been renewed over the past
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few decades, especially in the 1980s and brought doser to the West European average.
Besides the systemic damage to the religious culture, evidenced by the changed and
marginalized position of the church in society, the expropriation of its property and its
separation from the educational system, the secularization process has also been important
in Slovenia especially over the last decades just as in the case of Western Europe,
concurrently with the loosening of ideological bonds within the system and the processes of
renewal of religious culture.

4.0 An Attempt at East-West Comparison
The previous section dealt with the way religiousness developed in one nation under two
different systems and showed how Slovenia fits into this picture. Further light on the
problems in the East-West space is shed by Zulehner's analysis of Value Survey data for 26
countries from West Europe and Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia,
Lithuania, and Latvia. Using fifteen criteria from the religion section of the Survey (see 2.0
above) and the factor values he calculated the degree of socio-religiousness for .each
respondent and country sample. 14 This complex indicator was used to rank the countries, viz:
Poland ranked highest on socio-religiousness followed by Ireland, Northern Ireland, and the
United States of America. The bottom half of the ranking included the Czech Republic with
the lowest socio-religiousness, followed by East Germany, Sweden, and Denmark. Other
countries with high socio-religiousness were Italy, Portugal, Canada, Iceland, and Spain.
However, France, Lithuania, and the Netherlands ranked low, while Austria, Slovakia, West
Germany (former-FRG), Lithuania, Finland, Belgium, United Kingdom, Norway, Hungary,
and Slovenia came in the middle.
Zulehner arrives at the following conclusions: (I) considering that the majority of
former-socialist countries lie below the average, with the exception of Poland and Slovakia,
the hypothesis that religious culture was impaired in these countries seems to be confirmed;
(2)

n~vertheless,

both of the two extreme poles in the classification are occupied by

former-socialist countries: Poland at the top and East Germany and the Czech Republic at
the bottom of the rank order. The distribution of all the Central and East European countries
on this dimension does not permit any conclusions regarding the division between East and
West.
Zulehner proceeded to classify the countries into four categories according to level of
socio-religiousness: first, an extremely high level (Poland, both lrelands and USA), second,
an above- average level (Italy, Portugal, Spain, Iceland, Austria, and Slovakia), third, average
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Zulehner, pp. 39-43.
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religiousness with slight deviations downwards (Federal Republic of Germany, Finland,
Lithuania, Belgium, United Kingdom, Norway, Hungary, Slovenia, Netherlands), and fourth,
a low level (Latvia, France, Denmark, Sweden, East Germany, and the Czech Republic).
The very construct of the socio-religiousness dimension and the method of analysis call
for a critical methodological examination. The indicators included do not describe one but
several dimensions of religiousness on which important differences may be observed in any
given sub-sample. Thus, some countries rank highly primarily because of the confidence
shown in the church and the positive estimate of its effectiveness and authority, while others,
e.g. Slovenia and Slovakia, rank relatively low because of their responses to these same
indicators. This is precisely why the Czech Republic comes at the bottom of the ranking and
East Germany next above it, etc.
The following classification of all the countries into four groups appears more suitable:
group I) above-average socio-religiousness (Poland, both Irelands, USA, Italy, Portugal,
Canada, Iceland, and Spain), group 2) average socio-religiousness (+/- 0.20 deviation from
the average) (Austria, Slovakia, West Germany, Lithuania, Finland, Belgium, United
Kingdom, Norway, Hungary, and Slovenia), group 3) below-average socio-religiousness
(Netherlands, Latvia, France, Denmark, Sweden, East Germany, and the Czech Republic) .
. Most East and Central European countries thus come in the middle; Poland stands at the top,
and East Germany and the Czech Republic at the bottom. It would be difficult;to conclude
· from this ordering that these countries constitute a religious-cultural space quite separate
from West Europe. On this classification Slovenia groups with West European countries, such
as West Germany, Finland, Belgium, United Kingdom, Norway, Hungary, Netherlands,
France, etc.
Of course, this distribution similarly does not deny the hypothesis that the systemic
dimension is an important co-determinant of religious culture in the former-socialist
countries.
5.0 Conclusions
The Central and East European countries are differentiated significantly by systemic
determination of the position of the church and religiousness, along with cultural-historical
and modernization factors. Although indisputably state ideological regulations and
indoctrination systems worked against the church and religiousness in all cases, it is clear
from the results that the intensity of these factors varied from one country to another and
to a greater or lesser extent inside a particular country and period. In some the constraints
eased, and the repressive political regulation of the church let up, while in others it failed
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to act in the intended direction or triggered opposite effects. In some countries the
indoctrination systems functioned rigidly, strictly, and fully.
The question of the ideological determination of religious culture in the nine observed
Central and East European countries may be answered most easily by citing the examples of
Poland, East Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia which are all
marked by a strong predominance of Christian, and specifically Catholic, cultural-historical
features--with the exception of East Germany (and partial deviations by Hungary and the
Czech Republic). Nevertheless, precisely Slovenia, Poland, and East Germany are the most
illustrative examples of the three models of the effects of social, cultural, and ideological
factors on the development of religious culture. With the exception of Slovenia, a salient
feature of all the countries studied is their exclusiveness towards Europe. East Germany was
shut to the West for the entire post-war period, Hungary from the 1950s onwards,
Czechoslovakia in the 1960s and 1970s, etc. Slovenia by contrast reached the relatively
highest level of economic and socio-spatial development not just as a region (republic) of
Yugoslavia but primarily as a consequence of its openness and the intensive impacts from
West Europe and its neighboring countries. Movement of people was free to and from the
European space from the 1950s. This all allows the assumption that socio-religiousness there
was shaped not only by the more liberal Yugoslav and specifically Slovenian political system
and practices but above all by general European modernization trends.
The most outstanding cases among the countries examined are Poland and East Germany
which illustrate the effects of the systemic determinants of religious culture. In the case of
Poland the effects were striking and opposite to that intended. In view of current events in
Poland following the turnaround it may be surmised that given fifty years of democratic
social development Polish religious culture and the position of the church would have been
closer to that in West Europe in many ways. East Germany, today's new federal states,
illustrates the exceptional effectiveness of ideological regulation and repression as well as the
extreme impairment of religious culture. Over the past few decades in Slovenia the state and
the church have endeavoured to reach an accord, and ideological and cultural pluralism has
been established gradually. The deviations revealed by the Values Survey and the changes in
religious culture since the end of the 1960s to the present (Tos, 1993) may be attributed to
a

large

extent

to

the

modernization

process--urbanization,

industrialization,

de-agrarianization and the growth in social welfare--that is to say; a process that has been
significant throughout West European space in this period and its related secularization
:

effects.
In conclusion it may be reiterated:
(I )In the part of the world that has been examined (West, Central and East Europe and

North America) the process of secularization is universal and omnipresent.
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(2)The secularization process has varying intensity in different countries; it has begun at
different points in time.
(3)The secularization process is also evident in countries with a traditionally high level
of religiousness (Poland, USA, both lrelands, South America, etc).
(4)The level of secularization reached varies from country to country and is evinced by
differences in religious culture.
(5)Differences between 'West' and 'East' are perceptible but are insufficient to confirm
the assumption that secularization in the 'Eastern' countries is merely a consequence of state
pressure and ideological influence.
(6)Therefore, it holds for East Europe as well that secularization is launched by the same
general factors found in the West.
(7)1n some Eastern countries the systemic determination of religious culture (East
Germany, the Czech Republic) is striking. It is expressed in the decomposition of the
religious culture in these countries.
(8)1n exceptional cases systemic influences are opposite to those intended: religiousness
is strengthened, the secularization process is held up (Poland).
(9)1t may be assumed that the transition of the Eastern societies is holding up
secularization. In some of them not only has identification with the church been growing in
the last few years but so has religiousness, devoutness, and religious orthodoxy.
(I O)Secularization had already come to a halt in Slovenia in the mid-1980s; religiousness

has burgeoned especially in recent years. Reversal of the secularization trend, that is growth
of religiousness, is a reaction to systemic influences on religious expression and the shaping
of religious culture.
(II )In comparison with other Central and East European countries Slovenia is
above-average in level of religious culture and religious expression, while in comparison with
West European countries it is close to average, coming below southern Europe and above
northern Europe.
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